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Abstract
In analogy to the well–known notion of finite–state compressibility of individual sequences,
due to Lempel and Ziv, we define a similar notion of “finite–state encryptability” of an indi-
vidual plain-text sequence, as the minimum asymptotic key rate that must be consumed by
finite–state encrypters so as to guarantee perfect secrecy in a well–defined sense. Our main
basic result is that the finite–state encryptability is equal to the finite–state compressibility for
every individual sequence. This is in parallelism to Shannon’s classical probabilistic counterpart
result, asserting that the minimum required key rate is equal to the entropy rate of the source.
However, the redundancy, defined as the gap between the upper bound (direct part) and the
lower bound (converse part) in the encryption problem, turns out to decay at a different rate
(in fact, much slower) than the analogous redundancy associated with the compression problem.
We also extend our main theorem in several directions, allowing: (i) availability of side informa-
tion (SI) at the encrypter/decrypter/eavesdropper, (ii) lossy reconstruction at the decrypter, and
(iii) the combination of both lossy reconstruction and SI, in the spirit of the Wyner–Ziv problem.
Index Terms: Information–theoretic security, Shannon’s cipher system, secret key, perfect se-
crecy, individual sequences, finite–state machine, compressibility, incremental parsing, Lempel–
Ziv algorithm, side information.
1 Introduction
The paradigm of individual sequences and finite–state machines (FSMs), as an alternative to the
traditional probabilistic modeling of sources and channels, has been studied and explored quite
extensively in several information–theoretic problem areas, including data compression [5], [13],
[14], [18], [21], [24], [26], [27], [30], source/channel simulation [9], [15], classification [29], [31],
∗This research was supported by ISF grant no. 208/08.
1
prediction [2], [3], [12] [20], [22], [32], denoising [19], and even channel coding [8], [17], just to name
very few representative references out of many more. On the other hand, it is fairly safe to say that
the entire literature on information—theoretic security, starting from Shannon’s classical work [16]
and ending with some of the most recent work in this problem area (see, e.g., [4], [6], [7], [10], [23]
for surveys as well as references therein), is based exclusively on the probabilistic setting.
To the best of our knowledge, the only exception to this rule is an unpublished memorandum
by Ziv [25]. In that work, the plain-text source to be encrypted, using a secret key, is an individual
sequence, the encrypter is a general block encoder, and the eavesdropper employs an FSM as a
message discriminator. Specifically, it is postulated in [25] that the eavesdropper may have some
prior knowledge about the plain-text that can be expressed in terms of the existence of some set of
“acceptable messages” that constitutes the a-priori level of uncertainty (or equivocation) that the
eavesdropper has concerning the plain-text message: The larger the acceptance set, the larger is the
uncertainty. Next, it is assumed that there exists an FSM that can test whether a given candidate
plain-text message is acceptable or not: If and only if the FSM produces the all–zero sequence in
response to that message, then this message is acceptable. Perfect security is then defined as a
situation where the size of the acceptance set is not reduced (and hence neither is the uncertainty)
in the presence of the cryptogram. The main result in [25] is that the asymptotic key rate needed
for perfectly secure encryption in that sense, cannot be smaller (up to asymptotically vanishing
terms) than the Lempel–Ziv (LZ) complexity of the plain-text source [30]. This lower bound is
obviously asymptotically achieved by one–time pad encryption of the bit-stream obtained by LZ
data compression of the plain-text source. This is in parallelism to Shannon’s classical probabilistic
counterpart result, asserting that the minimum required key rate is equal to the entropy rate of
the source.
In this paper, we also consider encryption of individual sequences, but our modeling approach
and the definition of perfect secrecy are substantially different. Rather than assuming that the
encrypter and decrypter have unlimited resources, and that it is the eavesdropper which has limited
resources, modeled in terms of FSMs, in our setting, the converse is true. We adopt a model of
a finite–state encrypter, which receives as inputs the plain-text stream and the secret key bit-
stream, and it produces a cipher-text, while the internal state variable of the FSM, that designates
limited memory of the past plain-text, is evolving in response to the plain-text input. Based on
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this model, we define a notion of finite–state encryptability (in analogy to the notions of finite–
state compressibility [30] and the finite–state predictability [2]), as the minimum achievable rate
at which key bits must be consumed by any finite–state encrypter in order to guarantee perfect
security against an unauthorized party, while keeping the cryptogram decipherable at the legitimate
receiver, which has access to the key. Our main result is that the finite–state encryptability is equal
to the finite–state compressibility, similarly as in [25].
More precisely, denoting by c(xn) the number of LZ phrases associated with the plain-text
xn = (x1, . . . , xn), we show that number of key bits required by any encrypter with s states,
normalized by n (i.e., the key rate), cannot be smaller than [c(xn) log c(xn)]/n − δs(n), where
δs(n) = O(s log(log n)/
√
log n). On the other hand, this bound is obviously essentially achievable
by applying the LZ ‘78 algorithm [30], followed by one–time pad encryption (i.e., bit–by–bit XORing
between compressed bits and key bits), since the compression ratio of the LZ ‘78 algorithm is also
[c(xn) log c(xn)]/n, up to vanishingly small terms. It follows then that the finite–state encryptability
of every (infinite) individual sequence is equal to its finite–state compressibility.
While the idea of LZ data compression, followed by one–time padding is rather straightforward,
our main result, that no finite–state encrypter can do better than that for any given individual
sequence, may not be quite obvious since the operations of compression and encryption are basically
different – secret key encryption need not necessarily be based on compression followed by one–time
padding, definitely not if both operations are formalized in the framework of finite–state machines.
For finite sequences of length n, the difference between the upper bound (of the direct part) and
the lower bound (of the converse part), which can be thought of as some notion of redundancy, is
again O(s log(log n)/
√
log n), which decays much more slowly than the corresponding redundancy
in data compression [30, Theorems 1, 2], which is roughly O((log s)/ log n).
Finally, we extend our main basic theorem in two directions, first, one at a time, and then
simultaneously. The first extension is in allowing availability of side information (SI) at all three
parties (encrypter, legitimate decrypter and eavesdropper) or at the decrypter and the eavesdropper
only. We assume that the SI sequence is an individual sequence as well. We also assume that it
is the same SI that is available to all three parties in the first case or to both the legitimate
decrypter and the eavesdropper, in the second case. Extensions to situations of different versions
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of the SI at different users is deferred to the last step, which will possess the most general scenario
we study in this work. Our main result is essentially unaltered, except that the LZ complexity,
ρLZ(x
n)
∆
= [c(xn) log c(xn)]/n, is replaced by the conditional LZ complexity given the SI, to be
defined later (see also [11], [28]). Our second extension is to the case where lossy reconstruction is
allowed at the legitimate receiver (first, without SI). Here the LZ complexity is replaced by a notion
of “LZ rate–distortion function,” rLZ(D;x
n), which means the smallest LZ complexity among all
sequences that are within the allowed distortion relative to the input plain-text sequence. While our
framework allows randomized reconstruction sequences (that may depend on the random key), we
find that at least asymptotically, there is nothing to gain from this degree of freedom, as optimum
performance can be achieved by a scheme that generates deterministic reproductions. Finally, we
allow both SI and lossy reconstruction at the same time. Moreover, every party might have access to
a different version of the SI. The SI available to the legitimate receiver is assumed to be generated
by the plain-text source via a known memoryless channel. Here we no longer characterize the
performance in terms LZ complexities of sequences, but rather in the same spirit of the Wyner–Ziv
rate–distortion function for individual sequences using finite–state encoders and decoders [13].
It should be pointed out that throughout the entire paper, most of our emphasis is on converse
theorems (lower bounds). The compatible direct parts (upper bounds) will always be attainable
by a straightforward application of the suitable data compression scheme, followed by one–time
padding.
The outline of the remaining part of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we establish some
notation conventions and we formally define the model and the problem. In Section 3, we assert
and prove the main result. Finally, in Section 4, we extend our results in the above–mentioned
directions, and we point out how exactly the proof of the basic theorem should be modified in each
case in order to support our assertions.
2 Notation Conventions and Problem Formulation
We begin by establishing some notation conventions. Throughout this paper, scalar random vari-
ables (RV’s) will be denoted by capital letters, their sample values will be denoted by the respective
lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by the respective calligraphic letters. A sim-
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ilar convention will apply to random vectors and their sample values, which will be denoted with
same symbols superscripted by the dimension. Thus, for example, Am (m – positive integer) will
denote a random m-vector (A1, ..., Am), and a
m = (a1, ..., am) is a specific vector value in Am, the
m–th Cartesian power of A. The notations aji and Aji , where i and j are integers and i ≤ j, will
designate segments (ai, . . . , aj) and (Ai, . . . , Aj), respectively, where for i = 1, the subscript will be
omitted (as above). For i > j, aji (or A
j
i ) will be understood as the null string.
Sources and channels will be denoted generically by the letter P or Q, subscripted by the
name of the RV and its conditioning, if applicable, exactly like in ordinary textbook notation
standards, e.g., PXm(x
m) is the probability function of Xm at the point Xm = xm, PW |Sm(w|sm)
is the conditional probability of W = w given Sm = sm, and so on. Whenever clear from the
context, these subscripts will be omitted. Information theoretic quantities, like entropies and
mutual informations, will be denoted following the usual conventions of the information theory
literature, e.g., H(Km), I(W ;Xm|Sm), and so on.
A finite–state encrypter is defined by a sixtuplet E = (X ,Y,Z, f, g,∆), where X is a finite
input alphabet of size |X | = α, Y is a finite set of binary words, Z is a finite set of states,
f : Z × X × {0, 1}∗ → Y is the output function, g : Z × X → Z is the next–state function,
∆ : Z × X → {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and {0, 1}∗ is the set of all binary strings of finite length. The set Y is
allowed to contain binary strings of various lengths, including the null word λ (whose length is zero).
When two infinite sequences, x = x1, x2, . . ., xi ∈ X , henceforth the plain-text sequence (or, the
source sequence), and u = u1, u2, . . ., ui ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, . . ., henceforth the key sequence, are fed
into an encrypter E, it produces an infinite output sequence y = y1, y2, . . ., yi ∈ Y, henceforth the
cryptogram, while passing through an infinite sequence of states z = z1, z2, . . ., zi ∈ Z, according
to the following recursive equations, implemented for i = 1, 2, . . .
ti = ti−1 +∆(zi, xi), t0
∆
= 0 (1)
ki = (uti−1+1, uti−1+2, . . . , uti) (2)
yi = f(zi, xi, ki) (3)
zi+1 = g(zi, xi) (4)
where it is understood that if ∆(zi, xi) = 0, then ki = λ, the null word of length zero,
1 namely, no
1Note that the evolution of the state zi depends only on the source inputs {xi}, not on the key bits. The rationale
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key bits are used in the i–th step. By the same token, if yi = λ, no output is produced at this step,
i.e., the system is idling and only the state evolves in response to the input. An encrypter with s
states, or an s–state encrypter, E, is one with |Z| = s. It is assumed that the plain-text sequence
x is deterministic (i.e., an individual sequence), whereas the key sequence u is purely random, i.e.,
for every positive integer n, PUn(u
n) = 2−n.
A few additional notation conventions will be convenient: By f(z1, x
n, kn), we refer to the
vector yn produced by E in response to the inputs xn and kn when the initial state is z1. Similarly,
the notation g(z1, x
n) will mean the state zn+1 and ∆(z1, x
n) will designate
∑n
i=1∆(zi, xi) under
the same circumstances. An encrypter E is said to be perfectly secure if for every two positive
integers n, m (m ≥ n) and for every x ∈ X∞ and ymn ∈ Ym−n+1, the probability Pr{Y mn = ymn |x}
is independent of x.
An encrypter is referred to as information lossless (IL) if for every z1 ∈ Z, every sufficiently
large2 n and all xn ∈ X n and kn ∈ Kn, the quadruple (z1, kn, f(z1, xn, kn), g(z1, xn)) uniquely
determines xn. It will henceforth be assumed, without loss of generality, that z1 is a certain fixed
member of Z. Given an encrypter E and an input string xn, the encryption key rate of xn w.r.t.
E is defined as
σE(x
n)
∆
=
ℓ(kn)
n
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(ki), (5)
where ℓ(ki) = ∆(zi, xi) is the length of the binary string ki and ℓ(k
n) =
∑n
i=1 ℓ(ki) is the total
length of kn.
The set of all perfectly secure, IL encrypters {E} with no more than s states will be denoted
by E(s). The minimum of σE(xn) over all encrypters in E(s) will be denoted by σs(xn), i.e.,
σs(x
n) = min
E∈E(s)
σE(x
n). (6)
is that the role of zi is to store past memory of the information sequence x
n, in order to take advantage of empirical
correlations and repetitive patterns in that sequence, whereas memory of past key bits, which are i.i.d., is irrelevant.
Nonetheless, it is possible to extend the encrypter model to have two separate state variables, one evolving with
dependence on {xi} only (as above) and one with dependence on both {xi} and {ki}, where the former state variable
plays a role in the update of ti and the latter plays a role in the output function.
2It should be pointed out that this definition of information losslessness is more relaxed (and hence more general)
than the definition in [30]. While in [30], the requirement is imposed for every positive integer n, here it is required
only for all sufficiently large n. Note that lack of information losslessness in the more restrictive sense of [30] is not in
contradiction with the ability to reconstruct the source at the legitimate decoder. All it means is that reconstruction
of xn may require more information than just (z1, y
n, kn, zn+1), for example, some additional data from times later
than n+ 1 may be needed.
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Finally, let
σs(x) = lim sup
n→∞
σs(x
n), (7)
and define the finite–state encryptability of x as
σ(x) = lim
s→∞
σs(x). (8)
Our purpose it to characterize these quantities and to point out how they can be achieved in
principle.
3 Main Result
Incremental parsing [30] of a string xn is a sequential procedure of parsing xn into distinct phrases,
where each new parsed phrase is the shortest string that has not been encountered before as a
phrase of xn, with the possible exception of the last phrase that might be incomplete. Let c(xn)
denote the number of phrases in LZ incremental parsing of xn. The LZ complexity of xn is defined
as
ρLZ(x
n)
∆
=
c(xn) log c(xn)
n
. (9)
The finite–state compressibility, ρ(x), of the infinite sequence x = (x1, x2, . . .) is defined, in [30],
as the best compression ratio achieved by IL finite–state encoders, analogously to the above def-
inition of finite–state encryptability. From Theorems 1, 2 and 3 of [30], it follows that ρLZ(x)
∆
=
lim supn→∞ ρLZ(x
n) is equal to ρ(x).
The following theorem establishes a lower bound on σs(x
n) in terms of ρLZ(x
n) and hence a
lower bound of σ(x) in terms of ρ(x).
Theorem 1 (Converse to a coding theorem): For every xn,
σs(x
n) ≥ ρLZ(xn)− δs(n), (10)
where δs(n) is independent of x
n and behaves according to
δs(n) = O
(
s log(log n)√
log n
)
. (11)
Consequently, σ(x) ≥ ρ(x).
7
Discussion. A few comments on Theorem 1 are in order.
1. It is readily observed that a compatible direct theorem holds, simply by applying the LZ ‘78
algorithm followed by one–time pad encryption of the compressed bits. The resulting key–
rate needed is then upper bounded by 1n [c(x
n)+ 1] log[2α(c(xn)+ 1)], following [30, Theorem
2], which is, within negligible terms, equal to ρLZ(x
n). Thus, σ(x) = ρ(x).
2. Consider the difference between the upper bound pertaining to the direct part (as mentioned
in item no. 1 above) and the lower bound of the converse part. The behavior of this difference
is O(αs log(log n)/
√
log n). This behavior is different from the behavior of the correspond-
ing gap in compression (Theorems 1 and 2 in [30]), which is O([log(2α)] log(8αs2)/ log n).
The guaranteed convergence to optimality is therefore considerably slower in the encryption
problem.
3. As will be seen in the proof of Theorem 1, σs(x
n) is first lower bounded in terms of the m–th
order empirical entropy associated with xn (namely, the entropy associated with the relative
frequency of non–overlapping m–blocks of xn), where m is a large positive integer, and then
this empirical entropy in turn is further lower bounded in terms of ρLZ(x
n). The reason for
the latter passage is to get rid of the dependence of the main term of the lower bound on the
parameter m, which is arbitrary. This also helps to select the optimum growth rate of m as
a function of n.
4. We already mentioned that the definition of the IL property here is somewhat more relaxed
than in [30] (see footnote no. 2). Moreover, it is possible to relax this requirement even
further by allowing a relatively small uncertainty in xn given (z1, k
n, f(z1, x
n, kn), g(z1, x
n))
(see Subsection 4.2), at the possible cost of further slowing down the convergence of δs(n).
Proof. Let m divide n and consider the partition of xn into n/m non–overlapping m–vectors
x1,x2, . . . ,xn/m, where xi = x
im
(i−1)m+1. Recall that for a given z(i−1)m+1 and xi, the length li of
ki = k
im
(i−1)m+1 is uniquely determined as li = ∆(zi, x
im
(i−1)m+1). Let us now define a joint empirical
distribution of several variables. For every am ∈ Xm, z, z′ ∈ Z, and every positive integer l, let
PXmZZ′L(a
m, z, z′, l) =
m
n
n/m∑
i=1
1{xim(i−1)m+1 = am, z(i−1)m+1 = z, zim+1 = z′,∆(z, am) = l}. (12)
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Now, define
PKmXmYmZZ′L(κ
m, am, bm, z, z′, l) = 2−lPXmZZ′L(a
m, z, z′, l) · 1{bm = f(z, am, κm)} (13)
Throughout this proof, all information measures are defined w.r.t. PKmXmYmZZ′L. Consider the
following chain of equalities for the given xn and an arbitrary encrypter E ∈ E(s):
σE(x
n) =
ℓ(kn)
n
=
1
m
· m
n
n/m∑
i=1
ℓ(kim(i−1)m+1)
=
1
m
· m
n
n/m∑
i=1
H(Kim(i−1)m+1)
=
H(Km|L)
m
. (14)
Note that the length of the key for the i-th m–block, li = ℓ(ki) = ∆(z(i−1)m+1, x
im
(i−1)m+1) =∑im
t=(i−1)m+1∆(zt, xt), is a variable that may take on no more than (m+ 1)
αs−1 different values,3
and hence the same is true concerning the random variable L, and so, H(L) ≤ (αs− 1) log(m+1).
Thus,
σE(x
n) =
1
m
H(Km|L)
=
1
m
[H(Km)− I(Km;L)]
≥ 1
m
[H(Km)−H(L)]
≥ 1
m
[H(Km)− (αs− 1) log(m+ 1)]. (15)
Now, for all large m,
H(Km) ≥ H(Km|Y m)
≥ I(Km;Xm|Y m)
= H(Xm|Y m)−H(Xm|Y m,Km)
= H(Xm)−H(Xm|Y m,Km)
3To see why this is true, observe that the sum that defines li depends on xi = x
im
(i−1)m+1 and zi = z
im
(i−1)m+1 only
via the joint type class of pairs (x, z) ∈ X ×Z, associated with (xi,zi). Thus, the number of different values that li
may take cannot exceed the total number of such type classes, which in turn is upper bounded by (m+ 1)αs−1.
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≥ H(Xm)−H(Xm|Y m,Km, Z, Z ′)− I(Z,Z ′;Xm|Y m,Km)
= H(Xm)− 0− I(Z,Z ′;Xm|Y m,Km)
≥ H(Xm)−H(Z,Z ′|Y m,Km)
≥ H(Xm)− 2 log s, (16)
where the second equality is due to the perfect security assumption and the third equality is due
to the IL property, assuming that m is sufficiently large. Thus, combining eqs. (15) and (16), we
obtain
σE(x
n) ≥ H(X
m)
m
− 2 log s
m
− (αs− 1) · log(m+ 1)
m
. (17)
Now, the main term, H(Xm)/m, is nothing but the normalized m–th order empirical entropy
associated with xn. Next, as discussed earlier, we further lower bound H(Xm)/m in terms of
ρLZ(x
n) at the (small) price of reducing the bound further by additional terms that will be shown
later to be negligible. In particular, in the sequel, we prove the following inequality:
H(Xm)
m
≥ c(x
n) log c(xn)
n
− 2m(log α+ 1)
2
(1− ǫn) log n −
2mα2m log α
n
− 1
m
. (18)
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞. Combining this with eq. (17), we get
σE(x
n) ≥ c(x
n) log c(xn)
n
− δs(n,m) (19)
where
δs(n,m) =
2 log s
m
+ (αs− 1) · log(m+ 1)
m
+
2m(log α+ 1)2
(1− ǫn) log n +
2mα2m log α
n
+
1
m
. (20)
We now have the freedom to let m = mn grow slowly enough as a function of n such that
δs(n) = δs(n,mn) will vanish for every fixed s. By letting mn be proportional to
√
log n, δs(n)
becomes O(s log(log n)/
√
log n). Note that the first two terms of δs(n,m) come from considera-
tions pertaining to encryption, whereas the other terms appear also in compression. The second
term turns out to be the dominant one, which means that in the encryption problem we end
up with slower decay of the redundancy. If we compare the difference between the upper bound
and the lower bound in compression (coding them and converse in [30]), this difference is dom-
inated by a term that is O(([log(2α)] log(8αs2)/ log n), whereas in encryption the difference is
O(αs log(log n)/
√
log n), namely, a significantly slower decay rate.
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It remains then to establish eq. (18). To this end, let us first recall the analogous setup of
lossless compression of individual sequences using finite–state machines [30]. A q-state encoder C
is defined by a quintuplet (Σ,B,X , f, g), where Σ is the state set of size q, B is a finite set of binary
words (possibly of different lengths, including the null word for idling), X is the finite alphabet of
the source to be compressed, f : Σ×Y → B is the encoder output function, and g : Σ×Y → Σ is the
next–state function. When an input sequence (x1, x2, ...) is fed sequentially into C = (Σ,X ,B, f, g),
the encoder outputs a sequence of binary words (b1, b2, ...), bi ∈ B, while going through a sequence
of states (σ1, σ2, ...), according to
bi = f(σi, xi), σi+1 = g(σi, xi), i = 1, 2, ... (21)
where σi is the state of C at time instant i. A finite–state encoder C is said to be information
lossless (IL) if for all σi ∈ Σ and all xi+j−1i ∈ X n, j ≥ 1, the triple (σi, σi+j , b) uniquely determines
xi+j−1i , where σi+j and b = (bi, ..., bi+j−1) are obtained by iterating eq. (21) with initial state σi
and xi+j−1i as input. The length function associated with C is defined as ℓC(x
n) =
∑n
i=1 ℓ(bi),
where ℓ(bi) is the length of the binary string bi ∈ B.
Consider the incremental parsing of xn and let c(xn) be defined as above. According to [30,
Theorem 1], for any q-state IL encoder and for every xn ∈ X n, n ≥ 1,
ℓC(x
n) ≥ [c(xn) + q2] log c(x
n)
4q2
. (22)
Consider next the Shannon code, operating on xn by successively encoding its m–blocks, x1, x2,. . .,
xn/m, using an arbitrary probability distribution Q. According to this code, xi is encoded using
⌈− logQ(xi)⌉ bits, and so, its length function is given by
ℓS(x
n) =
n/m∑
i=1
⌈− logQ(xi)⌉
=
n
m
∑
am
PXm(a
m)⌈− logQ(am)⌉
≤ n
m
∑
am
PXm(a
m)[− logQ(am) + 1]
= − n
m
∑
am
PXm(a
m) logQ(am) +
n
m
. (23)
It is easy to see that this code can be implemented by a finite–state encoder in the following
manner: At the beginning of each block (t mod m = 1), the encoder is always at some fixed initial
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state σ0. At time instant t = (i − 1)m + j, 1 < j ≤ m, the state σt is defined as x(i−1)m+j−1(i−1)m+1 .
The encoder outputs the null string whenever t mod m 6= 1; when t mod m = 1, the encoder
emits the Shannon codeword of the block just terminated. The total number of states is therefore
q =
∑m−1
j=0 α
j = (αm−1)/(α−1). It is also easy to see that the Shannon code is IL. For given positive
integers i and j, suppose we are given σi, σi+j , and (bi, bi+1, ..., bi+j−1). Then (xi, xi+1, ..., xi+j−1)
can be reconstructed as follows. If time instants i and i + j fall in the same m-block then σj+1
conveys full information on (xi, xi+1, ..., xi+j−1). Otherwise, we use the following procedure: The
segment from time i until the end of the current block is reconstructed by decoding the codeword
emitted at the end of this block. Similarly, if there are any additional blocks that are fully contained
in the segment from i to i+ j, they can also be reconstructed by decoding. Finally, the portion of
the last block until position i+ j − 1 can be recovered again from the final state.
It now follows that the length function of the Shannon code must satisfy the lower bound (22)
with q = qm
∆
= (αm − 1)/(α − 1) ≤ αm, and so,
− n
m
∑
am
PXm(a
m) logQ(am) +
n
m
≥ [c(xn) + q2m] log
c(xn)
4q2m
. (24)
Since this holds for every Q while the right–hand side is independent of Q, we may minimize the
left–hand side w.r.t. Q and obtain
n
m
H(Xm) +
n
m
≥ [c(xn) + q2m] log
c(xn)
4q2m
≥ c(xn) log c(xn)− c(xn) log(4q2m)− q2m log(4q2m)
≥ c(xn) log c(xn)− c(xn) log(4α2m)− α2m log(4α2m)
≥ c(xn) log c(xn)− 2mc(xn)(1 + logα)− 2mα2m(1 + logα)
≥ c(xn) log c(xn)− 2mn(1 + log α)
2
(1− ǫn) log n − 2mα
2m(1 + logα), (25)
where the last inequality follows from [30, eq. (6)]. Eq. (18) is now obtained by normalizing both
sides by n. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
4 Extensions
In this section, we extend Theorem 1 in two directions, availability of SI and lossy reconstruction.
As described in the Introduction, we first consider each one of these directions separately, and then
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jointly.
4.1 Availability of Side Information
Consider the case where SI is available at the encrypter/decrypter/eavesdropper. Suppose that,
in addition to the source sequence x, there is an (individual) SI sequence s = (s1, s2, . . .), si ∈ S,
i = 1, 2, . . ., where S is a finite alphabet. Let us assume first that all three parties (encoder, decoder,
and eavesdropper) have access to s. In the formal model definition, a few modifications are needed:
1. In eqs. (1), (3), and (4), the functions ∆, f and g should be allowed to depend on the
additional argument si,
2. The definition of perfect security should allow conditioning on s, in addition to the present
conditioning on x. I.e., Pr{Y mn = ymn |x, s} is independent of x for all positive integers n, m
(but it is allowed to depend on s).
3. In the definition of an IL encrypter, the quadruple (z, kn, f(z, xn, kn), g(z, xn)) should be
extended to be the quintuple (z, kn, sn, f(z, xn, kn), g(z, xn)).
In Theorem 1, the LZ complexity of xn, should be replaced by the conditional LZ complex-
ity of xn given sn, denoted ρLZ(x
n|sn), which is an empirical measure of conditional entropy
(or conditional compressibility), that is defined as follows (see also [11], [28]): Given xn and
sn, let us apply the incremental parsing procedure of the LZ algorithm to the sequence of pairs
((x1, s1), (x2, s2), . . . , (xn, sn)). According to this procedure, all phrases are distinct with a possi-
ble exception of the last phrase, which might be incomplete. Let c(xn, sn) denote the number of
distinct phrases. For example,4 if
x6 = 0 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 1|
s6 = 0 | 1 | 0 1 | 0 1|
then c(x6, s6) = 4. Let c(sn) denote the resulting number of distinct phrases of sn, and let s(l)
denote the lth distinct s–phrase, l = 1, 2, ..., c(sn). In the above example, c(s6) = 3. Denote by
cl(x
n|sn) the number of occurrences of s(l) in the parsing of sn, or equivalently, the number of
4The same example appears in [28].
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distinct x-phrases that jointly appear with s(l). Clearly,
∑c(sn)
l=1 cl(x
n|sn) = c(xn, sn). In the above
example, s(1) = 0, s(2) = 1, s(3) = 01, c1(x
6|s6) = c2(x6|s6) = 1, and c3(x6|s6) = 2. Now, the
conditional LZ complexity of xn given sn is defined as
ρLZ(x
n|sn) = 1
n
c(sn)∑
l=1
cl(x
n|sn) log cl(xn|sn). (26)
The proof of Theorem 1 extends quite straightforwardly: The definition of PKmXmYmZZ′L should be
extended to PKmSmXmYmZZ′L in account of the empirical distribution that includes the m–blocks
of sn. In (16), all the conditionings should include Sm in addition to all existing conditionings,
resulting in the inequality
H(Km) ≥ H(Xm|Sm)− 2 log s. (27)
Finally, H(Xm|Sm) is further lower bounded in terms of ρLZ(xn|sn) since the latter is essentially
a lower bound on the the compression ratio of xn given sn using finite–state encoders (see [11,
eq. (13)]). The direct is obtained by first, compressing xn to about n · ρLZ(xn|sn) bits using the
conditional parsing scheme [28, Lemma 2, eq. (A.11)] and then applying one–time pad encryption.
The same performance can be achieved even if the encrypter does not have access to sn, by using
a scheme in the spirit of Slepian–Wolf coding: Randomly assign to each member of X n a bin, selected
independently at random across the set {1, 2, . . . , 2nR}. The encrypter applies one–time pad to the
(nR)–bit binary representation of the bin index of xn. The decrypter, first decrypts the bin index
using the key and then seeks a sequence xˆn within the given bin, which satisfies ρLZ(xˆ
n|sn) < R−ǫ.
If there is one and only one such sequence, then it becomes the decoded message, otherwise an error
is declared. This scheme works, just like the ordinary SW coding scheme, because the number of
{xˆn} for which ρLZ(xˆn|sn) < R − ǫ does not exceed 2n[R−ǫ+O(log(logn)/ logn)] [28, Lemma 2]. The
weakness of this is that prior knowledge of (a tight upper bound on) ρLZ(x
n|sn) is required. If, for
example, it is known that xn is a noisy version of sn, generated, say, by a known additive channel,
then R should be essentially the entropy rate of the noise.
The case where the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have access to different SI’s will
be discussed in Subsection 4.3, where we also extend the scope to lossy reconstruction.
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4.2 Lossy Reconstruction
Suppose that we are content with a lossy reconstruction, xˆn, at the legitimate receiver. In general,
this reconstruction may be a random vector due to possible dependence on the random key bits.
It is required, however, that d(xn, xˆn) ≤ nD with probability one, for some distortion measure d.
Then, in Theorem 1, ρLZ(x
n) should be replaced by the “LZ rate–distortion function” of xn, which
is defined as
rLZ(D;x
n)
∆
= min
{xˆn: d(xn,xˆn)≤nD}
ρLZ(xˆ
n). (28)
In the proof of Theorem 1, the joint distribution PKmXmXˆmYmZZ′L should be defined as the expec-
tation (w.r.t. the randomness of the key) of the m–th order empirical distribution extracted from
the sequences (kn, xn, xˆn, yn) and the resulting states {z(i−1)m+1}n/mi=1 and key lengths {li}n/mi=1 . The
definition of the IL property can be slightly relaxed to a notion of “nearly IL” (NIL) property,
which allows recovery with small uncertainty for all large enough n. In particular, we shall assume
that given w
∆
= (zi, k
i+n
i , f(zi, x
n+i−1
i , k
n+i−1
i ), g(zi, x
n+i−1
i )), xˆ
n+i−1
i must lie, with probability one,
in a subset An(w) ⊂ Xˆ n, where5
ηn
∆
= lim
n→∞
1
n
log max
w
|An(w)| = 0. (29)
Perfect security should be defined as statistical independence between the cryptogram and both
the source and reconstruction, i.e., the probability of any segment of {yi} should not depend on
either x or xˆ.
In the proof of the converse part, in eq. (16), Xm should be replaced by Xˆm in all places, and
we get
H(Km) ≥ H(Xˆm)− 2 log s−mηm, (30)
as H(Xˆm|Y m,Km, Z, Z ′)/m would be upper bounded by ηm. Then, H(Xˆm)/m is further lower
bounded in terms of EρLZ(xˆ
n), essentially in the same way as before, where here we have also
used the fact that, due to the concavity of the entropy functional, H(Xˆm) is lower bounded by the
expected m–th order conditional empirical entropy pertaining to the realizations of xˆn. Finally,
5This might be the case if unambiguous reconstruction of xˆn+i−1
i
requires additional information from times later
than t = n+ i−1. For example, if the encrypter works in blocks of fixed size m, xˆn is deterministic, and n≫ m, then
by viewing the block code as finite–state machine as before, there might be uncertainty in not more than the m last
symbols of xˆn in case the last block is incomplete (e.g., when m does not divide n or the n–block considered is not
synchronized to the m–blocks). In this case, |An(w)| ≤ |Xˆ |
m, which is fixed, independent of n, and so ηn = O(1/n).
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since we require d(xn, xˆn) ≤ nD with probability one, then EρLZ(xˆn) is trivially further lower
bounded by rLZ(D;x
n).
Again, the direct is obvious, and it implies that at least asymptotically, there is nothing to
gain from randomizing the reconstruction: The best choice of xˆn is the one with minimum LZ
complexity within the sphere of radius nD around xn. This conclusion is not obvious a–priori as
one might speculate that a randomized reconstruction, depending on the key, may potentially be
more secure than a deterministic one.
Note that we have not assumed anything on the distortion measure d, not even additivity.
Another difference between Theorem 1 of the lossless case and its present extension to the lossy
case, is that we are know longer able to characterize the rate of convergence of δs(n), as it depends
on the rate of decay of ηm. In fact, we could have replaced the IL property we assumed in the
lossless case by the NIL property there too, but again, the cost would be the loss the ability to
specify the behavior of δn.
4.3 Lossy Reconstruction With Side Information
The simultaneous extension of Theorem 1, allowing both distortion D and SI sn leads, with the
obvious modifications, to min{ρLZ(xˆn|sn) : d(xn, xˆn) ≤ nD}, whose achievability is conceptu-
ally straightforward when all parties have access to sn, including the encrypter. But what if the
encrypter does not have access to sn?
In this case, there is no longer an apparent way to characterize the minimum key rate that must
be consumed in terms of LZ complexities. This should not be surprising in view of the fact that
even in the less involved problem of pure lossy compression of individual sequences with SI available
at the decoder, performance is no longer characterized in terms of the LZ complexity (see, e.g., [13]
and references therein). Similarly as in [13], here we are able to give a certain characterization for
the case where the decrypter is also modeled as an FSM. While our performance characterization
may not seem very explicit, the main message behind it (like in [13]) is that the performance of the
best s–state encrypter–decrypter can be achieved by block codes of length m within a redundancy
term that decays as m→∞ for every fixed s.
Referring to our definition of the finite–state encrypter in Section 2, we model the decrypter as
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a device that implements the following recursive equations:
z′i+1 = g
′(z′i, yi, si) i = 1, 2, . . . (31)
xˆi−τ = f
′(z′i, yi, si, ki) i = τ + 1, τ + 2, . . . (32)
where τ (non–negative integer) is the encoding–decoding delay and z′i ∈ Z is the state of the
decrypter at time t. We also model the channel from xn to sn as a memoryless channel
PSn|Xn(s
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
PS|X(si|xi). (33)
We argue that the minimum key rate consumed by any finite–state encrypter–decrypter with s
states and delay τ is lower bounded by rs(D + τdmax/m), where dmax = maxx,xˆ d(x, xˆ) is assumed
finite and where rs(D) is defined as the minimum of H(K
m|L)/m = 1m
∑
l≥1 l · PL(l) over all
random variables (Yˆ ,W,L) such that: (i) the support of PL is of size (m + 1)
αs−1, (ii) Xm →
Sm → Yˆ is a Markov chain (perfect security), (iii) minhE{d(Xm, h(W,L,UL, Sm, Yˆ )) ≤ mD, (iv)
(W,L) → Xm → Sm is a Markov chain and Yˆ = g(W,L,Xm, UL) for some deterministic function
g, (v) the alphabet size of W is s2, and (vi) the alphabet size of Yˆ is the minimum needed (by the
Carathe´odory theorem) in order to maintain (i)-(v).
Consider again the partition of a block of length n into n/m non–overlapping blocks, each
of length m, along with the induced joint empirical distribution PKmXmYmZZ′L defined as before
except that now Z ′ is the random variable that designates the relative frequency of the state of the
decrypter z′t at times t = im+ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n/m. Next, define
PKmSmXmYmZZ′L = PKmXmYmZZ′L × PSm|Xm . (34)
First, observe that yim+mim+1 depends (deterministically) only on zim+1, x
im+m
im+1 , and k
im+m
im+1 . Similarly
xˆim−τ+mim−τ+1 depends only on k
im+m
im+1 , s
im+m
im+1 , y
im+m
im+1 , z
′
im+1 and l. Let us denote then
yim−τ+mim−τ+1 = g(zim+1, l, x
im+m
im+1 , k
im+m
im+1 )
and
xˆim−τ+mim−τ+1 = h(z
′
im+1, l, k
im+m
im+1 , s
im+m
im+1 , y
im+m
im+1 ),
Assuming that m > τ , let xˆim−τ+mim+1
∆
= h′(z′im+1, l, k
im+m
im+1 , s
im+m
im+1 , y
im+m
im+1 ), be defined simply by
truncating the first τ components of h(z′im+1, l, k
im+m
im+1 , s
im+m
im+1 , y
im+m
im+1 ). Next, extend the definition
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of PKmSmXmYmZZ′L to PKmLXmXˆm−dYmSmZ by defining PXˆm−τ |KmLSmXmYmZ′L as a degenerate
PMF that puts all its mass on Xˆm−τ = h′(Z ′, L,Km, Sm, Y m) = h′(Z ′, L, UL, Sm, Y m). Now
observe that eq. (34) implies that (Y m, Z, Z ′, L)→ Xm → Sm is a Markov chain. For the purpose
of obtaining a lower bound on the performance of finite–state encryption–decryption systems on the
consumed key rate, it is legitimate to let g include dependence on Z ′ and to let h include dependence
on Z in addition to their dependencies on the other variables involved. By doing so, the random
variables Z and Z ′ appear together in all relevant places of the characterization and thus, we can
define W = (Z,Z ′) which is a random variable whose alphabet size is s2. The (variable–length)
string Y m can be replaced by a single random variable Yˆ with the suitable alphabet size as defined
above.
As for the distortion, we have
D ≥ 1
n
E{d(xn, Xˆn)}
≥ 1
m
E{d(Xm−τ , Xˆm−τ )}
≥ 1
m
[E{d(Xm, Xˆm)} − τ · dmax] (35)
where Xˆm is defined by concatenating Xˆm−τ with a random τ–vector in Xˆ τ that is an arbitrary
function of (Z ′, L, UL, Sm, Y m) (or (W,L,UL, Sm, Y m)). Thus, the minimum required key rate,
H(Km|L)/m, of any s–state encrypter–decrypter cannot be smaller than rs(D + τ · dmax/m) by
definition.
We can achieve this performance by block codes as follows. For a given empirical distribution
of Xm and SI channel PS|X , find the optimum distribution conditional distribution PWL|Xm , the
encrypter g and the decrypter h that achieve rs(D). For every xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n/m, apply the
channel PWL|Xm to generate wi and li given xi, and then compute yˆi = g(wi, li,xi,u
li). Next,
transmit yˆi plus one–time pad encrypted versions of wi and li (to avoid any leakage of information
concerning xi via these random variables). These encryptions of wi and li require extra key rates
of (2 log s)/m and (αs − 1)(logm)/m, respectively. The information concerning the optimum h
should be transmitted to the decrypter once in an n–block. Its one–time pad encryption requires
additional key rate given by the description length of h, which depends only on m (as well as the
alphabet sizes), normalized by n, and hence it is negligible when n ≫ m. The decrypter simply
applies the decoding function h and outputs the reconstruction.
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Finally, note that if the eavesdropper has another version of the side information sequence, say,
s˜n (generated from xn by another known memoryless channel PS˜|X), everything remains the same
except that the perfect security requirement (ii) is replaced by Xm → S˜m → Yˆ .
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